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While it is generally consented that management quality is often the key determinant of banks’ 
success in a risky world, somewhat paradoxically early warning systems are mainly built on 
financial ratios driving management quality assessment to the periphery. In this paper we show, 
using estimated cost efficiency scores for the Czech banking sector, that cost inefficient 
management was a predictor of bank failures during the years of banking sector consolidation, 
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Nontechnical Summary 
While it is generally consented that management quality is often the key determinant of banks’ 
success in a risky world, somewhat paradoxically early warning systems are mainly build on 
financial ratios driving management quality assessment to the periphery. However, financial ratios 
seem to contain little additional information compared to that available to the public making the 
early warning systems ineffective. Therefore, we aim to suggest to measure management quality 
through banks’ relative cost efficiency and to study its signaling effect for the risk of bank failure.  
We employ three stochastic frontier efficiency estimation methods to evaluate the relative cost 
efficiency on data for the complete set of commercial banks (including exits and entries) in the 
Czech banking sector during the period of its substantial transformation and study their relation to 
the risk of bank failure. We find that the risk of bank failure is closely correlated with cost 
inefficient management. Besides, we observed that the banks that failed tend to gradually descend 
in the relative ranking of efficiency to the bottom quartiles and one year prior to failure the vast 
majority of them located in the last quartile. 
Our findings thus validate the signaling effect of deteriorating efficiency for risk of bank failure 
and support the inclusion of cost efficiency assessment in regular systems of early warning. The 
constructed power functions for each estimation technique showed that the stochastic frontier 
approach and random effects model are preferred for early warning systems to fixed effects 
model.      Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    3 
 
1. Introduction 
The weak performance and failures of commercial banks operating in the Czech Republic has 
repeatedly emerged as a conundrum during the economic transition that started in the early 1990s. 
Out of the 48 commercial banks operating in 1994 and another six licensed later on, 21 banks had 
failed by 2003, and except for 2001 and 2002 no year passed without at least one bank failure. 
This tendency in the Czech banking sector has not been an isolated case. Rather, it has been a 
general feature of banking sector transformation in the Central and Eastern European countries,
1 
and has required significant financial participation by government authorities (billions of euros). 
The majority of the measures undertaken by the Czech authorities to prevent multiple failures 
were aimed at improving banks’ financial ratios. Indeed, financial ratios play a dominant role in 
the early warning systems developed for classifying banks into failures and non-failures (Barr and 
Siems, 1994). In addition to standard financial indicators, early warning systems such as 
CAMELS, ORAP and PATROL
2 contain an assessment of management quality. However, this 
component appears underrepresented and, in addition, it is based on ad hoc information available 
to the supervisory authority. The Czech supervisory authority bases its assessment on a CAMELS 
rating. Derviz and Podpiera (2004) tested the marginal importance of the management component 
on a peer group of Czech banks and found that the rating can be almost entirely explained by just 
a few financial ratios. This confirms that the supervisory authority was relying on these ratios and 
that assessment of management quality played a minor role. However, the standard financial 
ratios targeted, such as ROA, ROE and capital adequacy, mirror mismanagement only shortly 
prior to the occurrence of bank failure. Moreover, they seem to contain little additional 
information compared to the publicly available information. Hanousek and Roland (2001) tested a 
variety of predictors of failed banks in the Czech Republic in 1994–1996 and concluded that the 
financial ratios did not outperform simple deposit interest rates.
3 
Numerous studies, for instance Seballos and Thomson (1990), Looney et al. (1989) and Cates 
(1985), emphasize management quality as the key determinant of banks’ success in a risky world. 
Given the weak performance of the described early warning systems for timely diagnosis of 
adverse developments in commercial banks in the Czech Republic during the sector’s 
transformation, we aim to test the potential relevance of advanced measures of managerial 
performance, such as cost efficiency scores. Barr and Siems (1994) used cost efficiency to proxy 
management quality and found that it had significant explanatory power for explaining 
bankruptcy in the USA. 
                                            
1 Poland and Slovakia, for instance, recorded similar developments. In Poland, at least one bank every year 
declared failure during 1993–2001, and from the 87 commercial banks operating in 1993, 23 banks were either 
in liquidation or bankruptcy or had been taken over by the end of 2001. In Slovakia, the total number of banks in 
the system decreased from 29 in 1997 to 20 in early 2002.  
2 CAMELS stands for C-capital, A-asset quality, M-management, E-earnings, L-liquidity, and S-market risk. 
This rating system was implemented in the USA in the 1980s.
 ORAP stands for Organization and Reinforcement 
of Preventive Action and has been in use in France since 1997. The five components of PATROL are: capital 
adequacy, profitability, credit duality, organization and liquidity. It was implemented in Italy in 1993 (for an 
extensive survey, see Sahajwala and Bergh, 2000). 
3 When a bank is in financial distress, it raises interest rates on deposits in order to collect liquidity and thereby 
signals its status. 4   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
Cost efficiency is the most conventional concept of efficiency pursued in studies of bank 
performance. In particular, stochastic frontier techniques have recently gained in popularity 
because of their property of removing the effect of differences in prices or other exogenous 
market factors, which could, if not accounted for, distort the correct assessment of managerial 
performance (Bauer et al., 1998). 
Cost efficiency analysis implies that banks are ranked according to their performance relative to 
the best-practice bank in terms of managing the operating costs of producing the same output 
under the same conditions, such as output quality, production function and market conditions, (see 
Berger and Humphrey, 1997, for a literature survey). Thus, a deterioration in the bank’s relative 
cost efficiency might signal its increasing vulnerability. 
The existing cost efficiency studies on the Czech banking sector are conducted predominantly in a 
cross-country framework, account for only a fraction of the banks operating, and focus on 
identifying cost efficiency and its determining factors (Stavárek, 2003; Grigorian and Manole, 
2002; Weill, 2003a; and Weill, 2003b). However, there is no study relating cost efficiency to bank 
failure. 
In this study, we address the correlation between cost inefficient management and bank failure by 
carrying out a cost efficiency analysis and Cox proportional hazards model estimation. We use a 
quarterly panel of all the banks operating in the Czech banking sector over the consolidation 
period (1994–2002). This enhances the statistical efficiency of the estimates in the relatively small 
Czech banking sector and allows for yearly evaluation of the relative efficiency scores and thus 
for tracking of banks’ relative efficiencies over time. In order to expose the results to a robustness 
check, we employ three parametric methods: stochastic frontier analysis, a yearly (four quarter) 
fixed effects model and a random effects model. Subsequently, we use our estimated efficiency 
scores and test their relation to the probability of bank failure in a hazard model.  
The results of our analysis validate the high relevance of regular cost efficiency screening for 
early warning signals of managerial problems in commercial banks. Our results unambiguously 
show that the banks’ rank-order based on relative efficiency scores possesses the ability to predict 
the risk of bank failure. Monitoring of the rank-order of failed banks in the years preceding their 
failure shows that two years prior to failure these banks are placed in either the fourth or third 
quartile of the ranking. One year prior to failure, the vast majority of the failed banks were among 
the worst performers. The results of the Cox proportional hazards model (i.e., assessing the 
probability of failure conditional on the relative cost efficiency score) confirmed a negative and 
significant relationship between cost efficiency and the risk of bank failure regardless of the 
technique used to derive the efficiency scores.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief description of the consolidation process in 
the Czech banking sector is outlined in Section 2. Section 3 presents the methodological approach 
to cost efficiency analysis and data description. Section 4 contains the results of estimating cost 
efficiency and the Cox proportional hazards model. Section 5 concludes.  Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    5 
 
2. Consolidating the Czech Banking Sector 
The consolidation of the Czech banking sector started in 1994 with a reduction in the number of 
banking licenses granted. This was a precautionary response by the Czech National Bank (CNB) 
to a surge in the number of licensed banks in the previous period, the low level of capital in small 
and medium-sized banks, and a high and growing share of non-performing loans in banks’ 
portfolios. 
The first six bank failures occurred during 1994–1996. To prevent a domino bankruptcy effect, 
the CNB carried out a quality control of bank portfolios, and by setting the necessary volumes of 
provisions and reserves it prepared for more radical action against banks with insufficient 
reserves. In 1996, more realistic assessment of risk positions was imposed, i.e., obligatory transfer 
of the potential loss from asset operations into a real loss (CNB, 1996). This step took the capital 
adequacy of many banks under the required threshold of 8%. As a consequence, shareholders of 
15 banks were obliged to increase capital so as to reach the threshold by the end of 1996. 
Nevertheless, the low quality assets remaining in the portfolios of small banks meant that there 
was still potential for adverse developments in these banks. A stabilization program was designed 
for small banks to give them an opportunity to gradually accumulate reserves. In particular, poor-
quality assets were temporarily purchased by Česká finanční a.s.,
4 i.e., replaced by liquidity, and 
only later (after sufficient reserves were created) purchased back by the banks. Despite these 
measures, bank failures continued to occur. Over the next two years (1997–1998), eight banks 
failed. 
In 1998, a privatization plan was prepared for the remaining state-owned banks. The operations of 
Konsolidační banka helped to clean up the portfolios of these banks in the process of preparation 
for strategic privatization. As a result of privatizations, mergers and failures, of the 29 Czech-
owned commercial banks (five of which were state-owned) operating in 1994, only four remained 
at the end of 2003. They were competing with 15 foreign commercial banks and nine branches of 
foreign banks. 
Between 1999 and 2003, the cases of bank failure diminished, but they did not disappear: seven 
banks declared bankruptcy. Notwithstanding the substantial measures taken by the Czech 
authorities, with the sole exception of 2001 and 2002 there was no single year without a bank 
failure between 1994 and 2003. The developments in the Czech banking sector left the Czech 
authorities with a financial consolidation bill for EUR 3.3 billion (IMF, 2005). 
                                            
4 An institution wholly owned by Konsolidační banka (Consolidation Bank). Konsolidační banka had the unique 
remit of managing non-performing loans. This bank was created in 1993 and was converted into Konsolidační 
Agentura (Consolidation Agency) at the start of 2001. 6   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
3. The Model 
3.1 The Choice of Method 
The methods for evaluating frontier efficiency basically break down into nonparametric and 
parametric methods. The former category is represented by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and the Free Disposable Hull technique. The latter comprises the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA) in a cross-section or panel data framework, the cross-section or panel data Thick Frontier 
Approach, and the panel data techniques of the Random Effects Model (REM) and the 
Distribution Free Approach (DFA). For a comprehensive survey and detailed description of these 
methods, see Berger and Humphrey (1997). 
In the analysis, we favored parametric over nonparametric methods for the reason that parametric 
methods study economic efficiency, i.e., allocative as well as technological efficiency, whereas 
the nonparametric techniques focus on analyzing technological efficiency only.
5  
The core principle of the parametric methods is based on introducing a composite error term and 
disentangling the inefficiency component from it. Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), a 
stochastic cost frontier can be expressed as: 
Ei  } exp{ * ) , , ( i i i w y c υ β ≥         ( 1 )  
 where Ei= ni
n
nix w ∑ is the total expenditure incurred by the bank i facing the prices wni >0 for the 
inputs xni and producing a vector of outputs yi ;β is a vector of the parameters to be estimated. 
The right-hand side of the inequality, i.e.,  } exp{ * ) , , ( i i i w y c υ β , represents the stochastic cost 
frontier. It consists of two parts: a deterministic part c(yi, wi,β ) that is common to all banks, and 
a bank-specific random part (error term), exp{ i υ }, representing the random shocks faced by each 
bank. 
 
The random shock is considered as a composite error term,  i i i u ε υ + = , consisting of the 
inefficiency factor ui, which brings the costs above those of the best-performing bank, and i ε , 
standing for the random error, to account for measurement error or other exogenous factors which 
can temporarily either increase or decrease the costs. 
Making use of alternative estimation methods, differing in their embedded distributional 
assumptions, is a compelling means to validate the results and strengthen their policy impact. 
Therefore, we employed three panel data parametric methods, namely the SFA, REM and DFA 
(in the form of the Fixed Effects Model – FEM). The small number of banks in the Czech banking 
sector prevented the application of cross-section analysis in the SFA and TFA. At the same time, 
application of methods that necessitate long periods of constant relative efficiency performance 
was deemed inappropriate due to expected significant changes in relative performance during the 
banking sector’s transformation. 
                                            
5 By ignoring prices, technological efficiency (as in the nonparametric methods) limits the consideration to too 
little output or too much input.   Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    7 
 
The differences between the particular parametric methods stem from the way inefficiency is 
disentangled from the random part of the stochastic cost frontier. The SFA assumes that the 
inefficiency term ui  has an asymmetric distribution (either half normal, truncated normal or 
exponential) whereas the random error  i ε has a symmetric distribution, usually normal. The 
inefficiency is then inferred indirectly from the estimated mean of the conditional distribution of u 
given u+ε ,  ) / ( ε + ≡ u u E u
) ) . Following Greene (1993), we assume that the inefficiency term has 
a truncated normal distribution – being a more general alternative. This implies that the point 
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2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + = . The cost efficiency for bank i is computed as: CEi=exp{-ui}.  
The FEM framework assumes that bank cost (in)efficiency is time invariant, implying that 
differences in efficiency among banks are constant within a year (four quarters). it ε  is a random 
error, i.i.d. (0,  ε σ ), and is uncorrelated with the regressors. No additional distributional 
assumptions are needed (see Fried et al., 1993).  
The assumption of the FEM regarding time invariant cost (in)efficiency could be a strong one, 
since over a year the relative efficiency might shift as a result of technical changes, interest rate 
changes, etc. Therefore, we employ the REM to relax this assumption. The use of the REM 
implies that the measured inefficiency stems from the variability across banks, while the variation 
within banks is exclusively due to the ordinary operating cost fluctuations for each bank. The ui 
are randomly distributed with constant mean and variance and uncorrelated with  i ε  and with the 
regressors (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
The calculation of the inefficiency in the case of the FEM and REM follows 
{ } n j u j j i i ,..., 1 | min = − = α α ) ) ) , where  j α )
 is the j-th bank-specific constant derived by the 
respective method. Whereas in the case of the FEM, the bank-specific constants are directly 
estimated through a bank dummy, in the case of the REM, we compute for bank i  
∑ − − =
t
it it T i x b a y
i ) ' * ( 1 α )
. 
Given the estimate of ui, the cost efficiency for bank i is computed: CEi=exp{-ui}. 
In order to compare the results of the estimation methods, we follow the consistency criteria 
formulated by Bauer et al. (1998). In particular, we compare the distributional characteristics of 
the inefficiency scores, such as their means and standard deviations. More crucially, we assess 
whether the three techniques generate a similar ranking of banks and compute the number of 
banks that are jointly identified by each pair of methods in the top ten and bottom ten banks. 8   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
3.2 The Cost Efficiency Frontier 
The specification of the cost frontier function takes the translog form. The translog function is the 
most commonly estimated one in the literature due to its sufficiently flexible functional form 
(Taylor expansion around the mean), which has proven an effective tool for empirical assessment 
of efficiency:
6, 7 
lnTCi= 0 α +
m
mn jm
j jm n m mn
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ln ρ γ γ β β + i υ  
where  i υ is the composite error term and TC denotes the total costs, namely, the sum of 
expenditures incurred for labor, physical capital and borrowed funds. The vector of input prices 
for labor, physical capital and borrowed funds is denoted by w.  Y  is the vector of outputs 
including demand deposits and total loans net of bad loans.
8 Demand deposits are included as an 
output because significant costs are associated with their production and maintenance (see Bauer 
et al., 1998).
 9 
Besides the usual industrial and commercial loans, real estate loans and loans to individuals, the 
total loans in this study also comprise interbank market loans. This is motivated by the fact that in 
the Czech banking sector interbank loans represent a significant share of total bank loans. Loans 
to other banks and to the central bank accounted on average for 30% of total loans over 1994–
2002. Moreover, as Dinger and von Hagen (2003) claim, the Czech banking sector operates as a 
two-tier system in which the interbank market is an important source of financing for small banks. 
In these conditions, excluding the interbank market would imply that the cost efficiency would be 
systematically biased upwards for the small banks and would likely contaminate the relationship 
between cost efficiency and risk of failure. 
Bad loans were excluded from total loans since their inclusion would potentially overstate the 
performance of careless banks. Although the administration of bad loans might be costly and 
hence the exclusion of bad loans biases downwards the cost efficiency of banks with a large 
portfolio of bad loans, it only helps to unveil banks’ suspicious practices and as such helps to 
                                            
6 While the Cobb-Douglas function would be too simple, the Fourier transformation would be unnecessarily 
complicated (see Bikker, 2004).  
7 Some studies include the factor share equations derived from Shepard’s lemma (Mester, 1996; Weill, 2003a). 
However, following Berger (1993), we are aware that including share equations would impose unnecessarily ex 
ante restriction of the allocative efficiency of the given input proportions. Nevertheless, Berger (1993) concludes 
that there are no significant differences between the results of estimates without share equations and with share 
equations (the fully restricted specification). 
8 Some authors, e.g. Weill (2003a), include earning assets other than loans as an additional output. However, we 
carried out the estimation of efficiency scores both including and excluding other earning assets and found very 
negligible differences in the rank-order of banks. Therefore, we opt for the more parsimonious specification 
because the production of other earning assets is not a key financial intermediation function. They constitute an 
equal investment opportunity for all banks, in the sense that any bank can opt to invest in these assets, and, 
finally, they do not involve substantial costs, unlike attracting deposits and granting loans. 
9 Besides, the recent advances in the classification of outputs and inputs using the opportunity cost approach, as 
employed by Guarda and Rouabah (2005), show that deposits are the only type of activity that is for some banks 
an output and for others an input. Therefore, to allow for a more flexible specification, we introduced deposits as 
both outputs and inputs.  Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    9 
 
detect problematic management, since in our view the bad loans were to significant extent not 
simply due to “bad luck” but to excessive risk taking (see Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Moreover, 
a peculiarity of the Czech banking sector’s development was the accumulation of huge amounts of 
bad loans in the accounts of Czech banks and the creation of Konsolidační banka, to which Czech 
banks have from time to time transferred their bad loans. Therefore, the inclusion of bad loans 
would artificially make considerable differences between banks’ outputs: those banks still having 
bad loans in their accounts at some point in time would appear with a higher output than those 
without bad loans or with their bad loans already transferred. In addition, the inclusion of bad 
loans could hide problems with a bank’s administration, as a bank that is not risk averse, having a 
large share of bad loans and a practically negligible cost of customer screening, would turn out to 
be very cost efficient, but would in fact possess a very high risk of failure. 
3.3 Data Description and Construction of Variables 
The quarterly real data
10 used in the analysis cover all commercial banks operating in the Czech 
Republic during the period 1994–2002 (see the list of banks in Table A-1 in the Appendix). The 
data are based on balance sheets and income statements of banks reported to CNB Banking 
Supervision.  
Since the analyzed period had been characterized by bank mergers, failures and entries, 
standardized treatment of these occurrences was required. Bank mergers were treated as follows: 
from the year of occurrence of the merger onwards, the bank resulting from the merger was 
considered as a single joint-bank (i.e., the data for the banks in the merger was consolidated in the 
year of the merger). Banks that failed within a particular year were considered as not operating in 
the whole year. For periods where some quarters of data for a bank were missing, the bank was 
excluded from the sample. Table 1 provides an overview of the entries, exits and mergers of banks 
and gives the number of banks in the system and the sample of banks used in the analysis. For 
more details on particular banks, see Table A-1 in the Appendix. 
Table 1: Developments in the Banking Sector 
         
   1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Entries
*  - 1 3 - 2 - - - - - 
Exits – official year of failure
**  1 2 3 5 3 3 2 - - 2 
Mergers  - - - - 2 - 1 1 1 - 
Banks in the system at the beginning of the year  48 47 46 46 41 38 35 32 31 30 
Excluded banks (incomplete year – missing data) 5 1 3 4 2 1 - 1 - 2 
of which: due to exit or entry within the year  - - 1 4 2 - - - - 2 
Sample of banks for analysis  42 45 43 37 36 34 32 30 30 28 
Note: 
*the entry of GE Capital Bank in 1998 took place via a purchase of part of Agrobanka.    
**revocation of license, conservatorship or liquidation; IP Banka and Agrobanka were treated 
as failures.   
 
                                            
10 Nominal data were deflated by the CPI with the 1994 average as the base. 10   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
As for the construction of the variables, demand deposits and total loans net of bad loans are 
considered as the outputs. Demand deposits represent the quarterly average of the Czech koruna 
real value of client demand deposits denominated in all currencies. Total loans net of bad loans 
comprise the quarterly average of the Czech koruna real value of loans denominated in all 
currencies granted to both resident and non-resident clients, loans to government, loans to and 
deposits with the central bank and loans to and deposits with other financial institutions. The 
amount of bad loans (loans 361 days past due) has been subtracted from the total.  
The price of labor, the price of physical capital and the price of borrowed funds were considered 
as the input prices. The price of labor represents the unit price of labor and is constructed as the 
quarterly average of the total expenses for employees divided by the end-of-quarter number of 
employees. The price of physical capital represents the unit price of physical capital and is 
constructed as the quarterly average of expenses for rents, leasing, amortization and materials 
divided by the book value of fixed assets. And finally, the price of borrowed funds is the quarterly 
average of interest expenses on funds borrowed from the government, central bank, other banks 
and clients and on securities issued, divided by the amount of these funds. 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Table A-2 in the 
Appendix compares our data to similar data sets in selected studies in terms of the max/min and 
mean/min ratios and the coefficient of variation. As we can see, our data are closely comparable 
with those used in similar studies of banking efficiency (see, for instance, Mester, 1992; Bauer et 
al., 1998; Weill, 2003b; Kasman, 2002; Kamberoglou et al., 2004; Shaffer, 2004; Williams and 
Gardener, 2000; Casu and Girardone, 2004). The highest similarity to the Czech data can be found 
in Western European countries such as France or the UK.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Output Quantities and Input Prices 
       
            1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total loans adjusted for bad loans (a,b)   Mean  22234 20982 23241 27392 27354 32493 30299 34070 35332 
       S.D.  56282 50516 51758 56220 53386 54323 51944 56979 60839 
       Max  262911 233656 255038 271600 250050 224880 217324 216930 108169 
       Min  394 48 307 340 222 492 369 262 212 
                        
Demand Deposits (a,b,c)   Mean  4978 4583 4525 6925 6242 7720 8087 10109 12378 
       S.D.  16446 14165 13152 19033 16385 17595 18491 22770 27680 
       Max  104402 88869 78543 86539 72511 72102 75492 84435 104038 
         Min  4 9 1 1 11 19 15 20 21 
                          
Price of Labor (a,b,d)     Mean  53776 58130 69078 71285 80362 87791 89261 91101 122038 
        S.D.  40280 40373 42690 43035 54949 55043 57104 51621 60360 
       Max  198643 197032 178993 188133 286526 237587 231971 244516 259479 
       Min  22513 25023 16223 26602 29128 33076 30154 31530 44521 
                        
Price of Physical Capital (a,b) Mean  0.093 0.1 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 
       S.D.  0.06 0.1 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 
       Max 0.26 0.57 1.05 0.61 0.63 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.58 
       Min  0.016 0.016 0.016 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.016 0.025 
            
Price of Borrowed Funds (a,b,e) Mean  0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.009 
       S.D.  0.007 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.01 0.004 0.011 0.004 
       Max  0.033 0.032 0.035 0.044 0.059 0.05 0.023 0.066 0.022 
         Min  0.011 0.01 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Notes: (a) Bad loans are those 361 days past due.  
            (b) The statistics were computed on bank-yearly averaged data.  
            (c) Real values in 10
6 of 1994 Czech koruna.  
            (d) Price of labor is in real (1994) Czech koruna expenditure per employee.  
            (e) Price of borrowed funds is the quarterly interest rate.    
 12   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Statistics on Efficiency Scores 
The cost efficiency frontier was estimated on nine yearly panels of four quarters for the nine 
consecutive years 1994–2002. The descriptive statistics of the main results of the three parametric 
methods for each year are presented in Table 3a.  
The mean cost efficiency, which is the percentage of the resources of the average bank sufficient to 
produce the same output if it were on the efficiency frontier, exhibits a decline in 1995–1998 and 
an increase in 1999–2002. Taking the SFA results, for instance, the score of 0.46 in 1994 indicates 
that the average bank was in that year wasting 54% of its resources relative to the best-practice 
bank. By 2002, however, the figure was only 18%. 
Our findings of a stronger mean efficiency performance in the period following 1999 seem 
intuitive, as many of the least efficient banks had already exited the market by that time and the 
restructuring and privatization had an efficiency enhancing effect (see Weill, 2003a, for evidence 
on the impact of foreign ownership on efficiency in Czech and Polish banks during 1998–2002). 
Table 3b summarizes the results of estimating the cost efficiency on pooled data
11 for different 
samples of banks – the full sample and the sample excluding entries and exits. The mean efficiency 
for the full sample appears to be 20 percentage points lower than that for the alternative sample. 
This finding shows that the mean efficiency is crucially dependent on the choice of the sample of 
banks, which complicates the comparison of efficiency development across studies that use 
different samples of banks.  
Even more crucially, estimating the efficiency scores on three sub-periods for the full sample and 
the sample excluding entries and exits, the derived mean efficiencies for the different samples 
differ even in their trend (see Table 3c). Whereas the results for the full sample show a decline in 
1997–1999 and an upswing in 2000–2002, the results for the alternative sample (two out of three 
techniques
12) suggest an increase in 1997–1999 and a decline in 2000–2002. Given our findings, 
we stress the need to analyze the entire banking sector in order to derive more conclusive results 
regarding the mean efficiency development of the whole banking sector. In the light of our 
findings, an exact comparison between the mean efficiency results of different studies working with 
different samples of banks is not advisable. 
Despite the limited comparability of the mean efficiency between studies, we found broad support 
in the existing literature for our results. Weill (2003a) analyzed a mixed sample of large Czech and 
Polish banks in 1997 using the SFA and found a median efficiency of 0.73; this compares with our 
median in that year for the entire Czech banking sector of 0.61. Employing DEA for 17 transition 
countries over 1995–1998, Grigorian and Manole (2002) find mean efficiency scores for the sample 
                                            
11 Assuming a constant ranking of banks during the investigated period to analyze the difference in mean 
efficiency between the different samples of banks.  
12 The third technique, i.e., the REM, is less reliable in small homogenous samples, as the inefficiency is derived 
from the variation across banks, which is limited in small homogenous samples. Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    13 
 
of large Czech banks between 0.55 and 0.8, with the lowest value during 1996–1997. Stavárek 
(2003) analyzed a large set of Czech banks during 1999–2002 using DEA and derived a mean 
efficiency of between 0.7 and 0.85. 
In the light of the cost efficiency findings for banking sectors internationally, the levels of mean 
efficiency in 2002 (0.52–0.82) suggest a convergence of the Czech banking sector in average 
efficiency to that found for both the U.S. and European banking sectors. According to the survey of 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), the efficiency scores from 50 U.S. bank efficiency studies displayed 
a mean of 0.72 for non-parametric techniques and a mean of 0.84 for parametric techniques. Bukh 
et al. (1995), in a DEA study of bank efficiency for Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, find 
mean efficiency scores of between 0.54 and 0.85. Fecher and Pestieau (1995) obtained mean 




Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Efficiency Scores: Full Sample of Banks 
      
            1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002     
Stochastic    Mean  0.46 0.82 0.41 0.57 0.28 0.53 0.52 0.62 0.82     
frontier  approach  S.D.  0.15 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.18     
        Min  0.18 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.33     
Random  effects   Mean  0.55 0.72 0.43 0.53 0.33 0.55 0.54 0.60 0.62     
model     S.D.  0.13 0.24 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13     
        Min  0.29 0.29 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.31     
Fixed  effects    Mean  0.41 0.36 0.36 0.45 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.49 0.52     
model     S.D.  0.18 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.22     
        Min  0.12 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.17     
Sample  of  banks  number  42 45 43 37 36 34 32 30 30     
                      
         Table 3c: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Efficiency Scores; Three-year Periods    
Table 3b: Efficiency Scores; Pooled Data 1994–2002           full sample     w/o entries and exits*      
      full sample w/o ee*             1994–96  1997–99  2000–02  1994–96  1997–99  2000–02     
Stochastic  Mean 0.42 0.61    Stochastic     Mean  0.47 0.43 0.56 0.70 0.75 0.73     
frontier  approach  S.D.  0.20 0.15    frontier  approach  S.D.  0.14 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.13     
    Min  0.15 0.36            Min  0.18 0.21 0.32 0.47 0.28  0.5     
Random  effects  Mean 0.45 0.66    Random  effects  Mean  0.61 0.47 0.57 0.86 0.73 0.94     
Model  S.D.  0.18 0.12    model    S.D.  0.13 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.16 0.02     
    Min  0.19 0.46            Min  0.29 0.24 0.34 0.68 0.33 0.89     
Fixed  effects    Mean 0.41 0.58    Fixed  effects    Mean  0.39 0.37 0.44 0.61 0.64 0.48     
model  S.D.  0.20 0.17    model    S.D.  0.15 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.17     
    Min  0.14 0.26            Min  0.15 0.09 0.19 0.38 0.13 0.29     
Sample  of  banks  number  45 22   Sample  of  banks  number  45 37 32 22 22 22     
Notes: The efficiency scores, derived using the stochastic frontier approach, were rescaled to the maximum outcome to achieve consistency among the results of 
the different methods.   
* Excluding exits and entries, i.e., banks continuously operating throughout 1994–2002: Komerční banka, Československá obchodní banka, Živnostenská 
banka, GE Capital Bank, Česká spořitelna, Českomoravská hypoteční banka, eBanka, Interbanka, Citibank, HVB Bank Czech Republic, ING Bank, 
Dresdner Bank CZ, Českomoravská záruční a rozvojová banka, Credit Lyonnais Bank Praha, J & T Banka, ABN AMRO Bank, Raiffeisenbank, IC banka, 
Commerzbank, Všeobecná úvěrová banka, Volksbank and Deutsche Bank.   Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    15 
 
4.2 Ranking Consistency between Methods 
In the spirit of the consistency conditions formulated by Bauer et al. (1998), we compare the 
outcomes of the SFA, REM and FEM in terms of rank-order correlation and correspondence 
between the ten best (worst) performing banks as independently identified by each method. A high 
rank-order correlation and percentage of jointly identified banks among the top (bottom) ten banks 
would validate the results for further policy decisions. Therefore, a correlation check between the 
rank-orders as derived from each of the three estimation techniques is necessary to endorse the 
reliability of our results. We report two correlation statistics: the Spearman and Kendall correlation 
coefficients. The differences between the two measures come from their different theoretical 
backgrounds.
13 Table 4 presents the sample period average of the rank correlations. Both measures 
show a high correlation in the bank rankings identified by the three techniques. The average of the 
yearly Spearman correlation coefficients (the upper triangle in Table 4) between the SFA and the 
FEM is 0.72, between the SFA and the REM it is 0.95 and between the REM and the FEM it is 
0.68.
14 The Kendall’s tau-a coefficients of correlation (the lower triangle) show lower values, but 
the qualitative result remains unchanged. All the correlation coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at the 1% significance level. 
Table 4: Spearman and Kendall Correlations    Table 5: Top and Bottom Ten Correspondence 
Average SFA  REM  FEM    Average  SFA  REM  FEM 
SFA 1.00  0.95
*** 0.72
***   SFA  1.00  0.82  0.70 
REM 0.84
*** 1.00  0.68
***   REM  0.93  1.00  0.67 
FEM 0.55
*** 0.50
*** 1.00    FEM  0.70  0.60  1.00 
Note: Kendall’s tau-a (lower triangular),    Note: bottom ten correspondence (lower triangular) 
          Spearman (upper triangular)              top ten correspondence (upper triangular) 
          
*** denotes 1% significance level           
 
Table 5 presents the results of the proportion of banks that were identified by one estimation 
technique in the top (bottom) ten best-practice (worst-practice) banks that were also identified in 
the top ten (bottom ten) banks by another estimation technique. The correspondence among the 
best-practice banks according to the SFA and the FEM averages 70% over the whole period. The 
same degree of consistency was found for the worst-practice banks. The correspondence between 
the SFA and the REM is 82% in the case of the best-practice banks and 93% for the worst-practice 
banks. Between the REM and the FEM the proportion of jointly identified banks is 67% for the 
                                            
13 The Spearman correlation is based on ranking the two variables, making no assumption about the distribution of 
the values. The Spearman correlation measure depends on the sample size, which is not the case for the Kendall 
correlation. With the Spearman formula, X is ranked, Y is ranked separately from X, and the Pearson correlation 
coefficient of the ranks of X and Y is calculated. The Kendall formula is based on the probability of observing 
Y2>Y1 when X2>X1. For both the Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients, a value of -1 indicates a perfect 
trend for Y to decrease as X increases, while a value of 1 indicates a perfect trend for Y to increase as X increases. 
14 In Bauer et al. (1998), the Spearman rank-order correlations among the efficiency scores produced by the 
various techniques vary between -0.195 and 0.895 (0.49 between the SFA and the FEM). Eisenbeis, Ferrier and 
Kwan (1996) find a Spearman ranking of 0.44 and 0.59 between the DEA and the SFA. Ferrier and Lovell (1990) 
obtain a ranking correlation of 0.02. Bauer and Hancock (1993) obtain a coefficient of 0.7 across parametric and 
non-parametric techniques. 16   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
best-practice banks and 60% for the worst-practice banks. These results imply high consistency 
between the techniques used, and especially between the SFA and the REM, i.e., much higher than 
that found by Bauer et al. (1998).
15 
4.3 Rank-Order and Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
The analysis of the relationship between the relative efficiency scores and the likelihood of bank 
failure uses two approaches: a simple assessment of the rank-order placement of failing banks prior 
to their failure, and estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model. 
The former approach is based on year-by-year systematic recording of the position of failed banks 
in the quartiles of the banks’ rank-order. We ordered the failed banks according to their survival 
length and labeled them accordingly (i.e., Bank 1 has the shortest survival length; Bank 21 has the 
longest survival length). For each year prior to the year of their failure we recorded their placement 
in the quartiles of the rank-ordered banks. The results are presented in Table 6 for the SFA and in 
Table 7 for the FEM and the REM. At the bottom of the tables we give the number of banks in the 
sample. 
As Table 6 shows, five years prior to failure the failing banks were found around the second 
quartile. Within three to four years prior to failure, the banks tended to descend towards the third 
quartile. Two years prior to failure, 56% of the banks were in the bottom cost efficiency quartile 
and 23% of them were in the third quartile. One year prior to failure, 83% of the banks were in the 
fourth quartile and 6% in the third quartile. Besides the tendency of failing banks to be located in 
the bottom quartile prior to their failure, banks tend to descend even to the lowest places within the 
bottom quartile. This can be seen from the numbers in parentheses in Table 6, which show the 
placement of banks within the fourth quartile (1 denotes the least efficient bank, 2 stands for the 
second least efficient bank, etc.).  
The placements of banks according to their efficiency scores in the quartiles of the FEM and the 
REM (see Table 7) closely resemble the SFA placement. With the exception of one or two banks, 







                                            
15 In the U.S. banking sector, Bauer et al. (1998) found a correspondence between the SFA and FEM bank 
rankings of 50% for the best-practice and 52% for the worst-practice banks.  
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Table 6: Placement in Quartile of Cost Efficiency Scores Prior to Failure; SFA   
Bank  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
1  F                
2  n.a.  F              
3  3  4(3)  F             
4  4(2)  4(1)  F            
5  4(3)  4(9)  F            
6  1  3  F            
7  2  1  4(5)  F         
8  2  3  4(8)  F           
9  3  3  4(2)  F           
10  4(1)  4(2)  4(1)  F           
11  n.a.  4(8)  n.a.  F           
12 4(5)  4(11)  4(4) 4(7)  F               
13 3  3 4(7)  4(1)  F               
14 n.a. n.a.  2  4(2) F               
15 4  3  3  3  4(6)  F             
16 1  1  2  1  4(1)  F             
17 1  2  3 4(3)  4(2)  F             
18 4  3  4(10)  4(8)  4(3)  n.a.  F           
19 2  2  3  4  3 2 F           
20 3  3  3  4(10)  4(5)  4(2)  4(1)  4(1)  4(1)  F   
21 1 2  1  1 1 1 1  4(7)  1 F   
Sample  42 45  43  37 36 34 32 30 30 28   
Notes: The number in the cell xy represents the quartile in which the bank x was in period y prior to its failure  
(1 denotes first quartile, 2 stands for second quartile, etc.). In parenthesis is the actual ranking from the 
bottom: 1 denotes the least efficient bank; F denotes failure. 
Table 7: Placement in Quartile of Cost Efficiency Scores Prior to Failure; FEM/REM    
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
1  F                
2  n.a.  F              
3  3/3  4/4  F             
4  4/4  4/4  F            
5  4/4  4/4  F            
6  ½  2/2  F            
7  ½  2/4  4/4  F         
8  3/2  3/3  2/4  F           
9  4/3  4/4  4/4  F           
10  4/4  4/4  4/4  F           
11  n.a.  2/4  n.a.  F           
12 4/4 4/3 4/4 3/4  F               
13 3/2 3/3 2/4 4/4  F               
14 n.a. n.a. 2/2 4/4  F               
15 4/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 4/4 F             
16 2/1 2/1 1/1 4/4 4/4 F             
17 1/1 2/2 3/3 4/4 4/4 F             
18 4/4 4/3 3/3 3/4 4/4  n.a. F           
19 2/2 4/3 4/3 4/4 4/2  4/2 F           
20  3/3 3/3  3/2  4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4    F   
21  1/1 2/1  1/1  1/1 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/4 1/3  F   
Sample  42 45  43  37 36 34 32 30 30 28   
Notes: The number x/y denotes the quartile of the scores derived by the FEM/REM.   18   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
The evidence on failing banks’ descending tendency in rank-order towards the bottom efficiency 
quartiles prior to failure suggests that cost efficiency scores should be included among the early 
warning indicators. In order to formally test whether a cost efficiency score is a valid predictor of 
bank failure, i.e., the probability of bank failure given cost efficiency scores – the standard early 
warning model, we estimate Cox’s (1972) proportional hazards model similarly to the mainstream 
literature on bank failures – see, for instance, Lane et al. (1986) or Whalen (1991).
16  
The literature dealing with predicting bank failure emphasizes the advantages of estimating a 
hazard model over single period models. Shumway (2001) summarizes three main reasons for 
preferring hazard models for forecasting bankruptcy. First, single-period models fail to control for 
each firm’s period at risk. Second, hazard models incorporate explanatory variables that change 
with time, and finally, hazard models appear to produce more efficient out-of-sample forecasts. 
Given the survival-time data, the Cox proportional hazards model capturing the effect of covariates 
on the hazard rate is represented by the following specification: 
λ(t|z)=λ0(t)e
zβ, 
where λ(t|z) is the hazard rate, which represents the probability of ‘failure’ in a given (short) time 
interval, conditional on surviving to period t. The estimated hazard rate is based on empirical 
observations of banks’ continuous operation until time t (the dependent variable takes the value 
zero – the empirical probability of failure equals zero) and the occurrence of failure at time t+1 (the 
dependent variable takes the value 1 – the empirical probability of failure is certainty). Further, 
λ0(t) is a baseline hazard, z is a vector of the measured explanatory variables and β
 is a vector of 
parameters.  
We perform the hazard rate estimations against the efficiency scores derived by the SFA, FEM and 
REM. In an additional estimation, we include the ratio of bad loans to total assets to control for the 
possible effect of bad loans on the efficiency scores. By excluding bad loans for the sake of 
comparability of the outputs between banks in terms of quality when estimating the efficiency 
scores, we lowered output for banks with bad loans and thus possibly also lowered their cost 
efficiency. However, as Table 8 shows, the correlation between the cost efficiency scores and the 
share of bad loans in total assets appears rather low, thus not confirming that bad loans determine 
the efficiency scores.  
Table 8: Correlations    





*** denotes 1% significance level. 
 
                                            
16Although the Cox proportional hazards model is advantageous for avoiding the strong distributional assumptions 
associated with the parametric survival-time models and is thus preferred in this study, Cole and Gunther (1995) 
suggested possible benefits of separating the likelihood of failure from the time to failure, as they might generally 
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Nevertheless, we present the Cox proportional hazards model for both the single factor model (cost 
efficiency) and the two-factor model (which also includes bad loans/total assets in order to account 
for the effect of bad loans). The results are displayed in Table 9.  
Table 9: Cox Proportional Hazards Model (reported are coefficients)   




** -69.02   0.20 
HR=f(REM, BL/TA)  0.041(0.009)
*** -5.43(2.04)
*** -67.75    0.22 
HR=f(FEM, BL/TA)  0.05(0.008)
*** -3.46(1.78)
** -69.35     0.20 
HR=f(SFA) -    -4.96(1.42)
*** -78.79    0.10 
HR=f(REM) -    -7.71(1.88)
*** -75.91    0.14 
HR=f(FEM) -    -3.97(1.58)
** -82.27     0.06 
Note: HR stands for hazard rate; BL/TA represents the ratio of bad loans to total assets; 
EFF stands for efficiency scores; standard errors are in parentheses; number of 
observations: 326; failures: 19; asterisks denote significance level: *10%, **5%, and 
***1%. 
 
Our results confirm that after controlling for the effect of bad loans (the coefficient on the ratio is 
positive and significant in all regressions, that is, the higher the ratio, the higher the risk of bank 
failure), the efficiency score significantly explains the risk of failure regardless of the method used 
for the efficiency evaluation, i.e., the SFA, FEM or REM. The coefficients on the variable EFF 
(efficiency scores) are negative and significant (see the upper half of Table 9), implying that a 
decrease in efficiency increases the risk of bank failure. This conclusion is confirmed by the hazard 
model estimation with the single factor (see the lower half of Table 9) – a negative and significant 
relation between efficiency and the risk of bank failure. 
All in all, the relative efficiency scores derived by all three estimation methods proved to be valid 
predictors of the risk of bank failure and placed the majority of failing banks in the least efficient 
quartile one year prior to their failure. Our results thus underline the findings concerning the 
relationship between cost efficiency and bank failure of Berger and Humphrey (1992), Barr and 
Siems (1994) and Wheelock and Wilson (1995), who conclude that failing banks tend to locate far 
from the efficiency frontier. In our case, the vast majority of the failed banks were in the fourth 
quartile one year prior to failure. 
4.4 Power Functions and Early Warning Model Selection 
Although it has been shown that the rank-orders based on the SFA, the REM and the FEM exhibit 
strong correlation and very close correspondence in terms of the top ten and bottom ten banks, it 
might be beneficial to discriminate among the methods in terms of their performance for an early 
warning model.  
A convenient criterion for selecting the best performing early warning model is based on evaluation 
of power functions (see Gilbert et al., 2000). Usually, the construction of the power function is 
done through the successive computation of type I (false negative) and type II (false positive) 20   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
errors
17 for different cut-off predicted probabilities of failure. Since we focus on the predictive 
performance of the cost efficiency scores, we employ this framework on the domain of efficiency 
scores instead of through the hazard model mapped probabilities of failure.
18 In order to compute 
the power function, we set ten cut-off efficiency scores, i.e., 0, 0.1, …, 1, and for each of them 
evaluate both the type I and type II errors. Thus, for instance, if the cut-off point is an efficiency 
score of 1 (all banks that have efficiency below 1 are labeled as failures, i.e., in this case all banks), 
the type I error is zero percent (of missed next-year bank failures), and the type II error is one 
hundred percent (of misidentified next-year non-failures). 
The plot of the two types of errors represents a trade-off between excessive screening of banks that 
do not fail on the one hand and failing to identify failed banks on the other. The errors constructed 
from the data over nine years (i.e., the number of next-year failures weighted average of the in each 
year evaluated type I and type II errors) can be seen in Figure 1.  













                                            
17 The type I error stands for the probability of omitting to select a failed bank among potentially failing ones, 
whereas the type II error represents the probability of labeling a bank as likely to fail which does not actually fail.  
18 This is due to the fact that the predicted probabilities from the estimated hazard model (the one factor model) 
only map the efficiency domain into the domain of probability of failure. Thus, using the efficiency scores directly 
simplifies the application of the efficiency evaluation for the power function computation. If the early warning 
model consisted of more indicators than efficiency scores, it would be necessary to perform the hazard model 
estimation and apply the power function to the results of the hazard model.  Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    21 
 
The smallest area under the curves pertains to the most effective early warning model, since such a 
model minimizes the type II error for all values of the type I error. In other words, for any given 
share of missed next-year bank failures, it minimizes cost of screening healthy banks. The smallest 
area corresponds to the REM (0.27), closely followed by the SFA (0.29). The FEM (0.36) seems to 
be outperformed by the previous two estimation methods. 
Furthermore, as indicated on the plot, a cut-off efficiency score of 0.4 for the SFA is probably 
optimal, since a higher cut-off score would add to the type II error without lowering the type I 
error, and similarly a lower cut-off score would lower the type II error by 10% but double the type I 
error to 40%. Taking a 0.4 cut-off means that two out of every ten next-year failed banks will 
remain unidentified and roughly three out of every ten non-failed banks will be screened. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper studies the signaling effect of cost inefficient management for the risk of bank failure. 
Finding reliable early warning indicators of problematic management in banks is becoming an 
increasingly important issue, given the low signaling performance of the commonly applied 
financial ratios. 
Using data for the complete set of commercial banks (including exits and entries) in the Czech 
banking sector during the period of substantial transformation of the sector, we show that the risk 
of bank failure is closely correlated with cost inefficient management. Estimates of relative cost 
efficiency scores, using three alternative parametric methods, proved to be significant predictors of 
the risk of bank failure. Moreover, we observed that the banks that failed tended to gradually 
descend down the relative efficiency ranking to the bottom quartiles, and one year prior to failure 
all failed banks were placed in the least efficient quartile by at least one method. Our findings thus 
validate the signaling effect of deteriorating efficiency for the risk of bank failure. The power 
functions constructed for each estimation technique showed that for early warning systems, the 
stochastic frontier approach and random effects model are preferred to the fixed effects model. 
In addition, by comparing the mean efficiency derived from the full sample of banks and that from 
a sample of banks excluding entries and exits, we noted a substantial dependence of the mean 
efficiency on sample selection. It follows that mean efficiency results derived on different samples 
in different periods are rather difficult to compare. 22   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
References  
BAUER, P., AND D. HANCOCK (1993): “The Efficiency of the Federal Reserve in Providing Check 
Processing Services.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 17, 287–311. 
BAUER P., A. BERGER, G. FERRIER, AND D. HUMPHREY (1998): “Consistency Conditions for 
Regulatory Analysis of Financial Institutions: A Comparison of Frontier Efficiency 
Methods.” Journal of Economics and Business, 50, 85–114. 
BARR, R., AND T. SIEMS (1994): “Predicting Bank Failure Using DEA to Quantify Management 
Quality.” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Financial Industry Studies Working Paper No. 
1-94. 
BERGER, A. (1993): “Distribution-free Estimates of Efficiency in the U.S. Banking Industry and 
Tests of the Standard Distributional Assumptions.” Journal of Productivity Analysis, 4, 
261–292. 
BERGER,  A., AND R.  DEYOUNG (1997): “Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency in Commercial 
Banks.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 849–870. 
BERGER, A., AND D. HUMPHREY (1992): “Measurement and Efficiency Issues in Commercial 
Banking.” In Z. Griliches, ed., Measurement Issues in the Service Sectors. National Bureau 
of Economic Research, University of Chicago Press, 245–279. 
BERGER, A., AND D. HUMPHREY (1997): “Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International Survey 
and Directions for Further Research.” European Journal of Operational Research, 98, 175–
212. 
BIKKER, J. A. (2005): Competition and Efficiency in a Unified European Banking Market. E. E. 
Publishing Inc., UK.  
BUKH, P., S. BERG, AND F. FORSUND (1995): “Banking Efficiency in the Nordic Countries: A 
Four-Country Malmquist Index Analysis.” University of Aarhus WP, Denmark. 
CASU, B., AND C. GIRARDONE (2004): “An Analysis of the Relevance of OBS Items in Explaining 
Productivity Change in European Banking.” EFMA 2004 Basel Meetings Paper. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=492863. 
CATES, D.C. (1985): “Bank Risk and Predicting Bank Failure.” Issues in Bank Regulation,9,16–20. 
CNB (1996): Banking Supervision in the Czech Republic. Czech National Bank, Prague. 
CNB (2001): Banking Supervision in the Czech Republic. Czech National Bank, Prague. 
CNB (2002): Banking Supervision in the Czech Republic. Czech National Bank, Prague. 
COLE,  R.  A., AND J.  W.  GUNTHER (1995): “Separating the Likelihood and Timing of Bank 
Failure.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 1073–1089. 
COX, D. R. (1972): Regression Models and Life Tables. Journal of Royal Statistics Society, 34, 
187–220. 
DERVIZ, A., AND J. PODPIERA (2004): “Predicting Bank CAMELS and S&P Ratings: The Case of 
the Czech Republic.” Czech National Bank WP No. 1. Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    23 
 
DINGER, V., AND J. VON HAGEN (2003): “Bank Structure and Profitability in Central and Eastern 
European Countries.” Paper prepared for IAES conference, Lisbon. 
EISENBEIS, R., G. FERRIER, AND S. KWAN (1996): An Empirical Analysis of the Informativeness of 
Programming and SFA Efficiency Scores: Efficiency and Bank Performance. University of 
North Carolina WP, Chapel Hill. 
FECHER, F., AND P. PESTIEAU (1993): “Efficiency and Competition in OECD Financial Services.” 
In H. O. Fried, C. A. K. Lovell, and S. S. Schmidt, eds., The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency: Techniques and Applications. Oxford University Press, UK, 374–385. 
FERRIER, G., AND C. A. K. LOVELL (1990): “Measuring Cost Efficiency in Banking: Econometric 
and Linear Programming Evidence.” Journal of Econometrics, 46, 229–245. 
FRIED, H., C. A. K. LOVELL, AND S. SCHMIDT (1993): The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. 
Techniques and Applications. Oxford University Press, New York. 
FRIES, S., D. NEVEN, AND P. SEABRIGHT (2002): “Bank Performance in Transition Economies.” 
EBRD Working Paper 76, November. 
GILBERT, R. A., A. P. MEYER, AND M. D. VAUGHAN (2000): “The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade 
Model in Bank Surveillance”. WP21, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
GREENE, W. H. (1993): “The Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis”. In H. O. Fried, C. A. 
K. Lovell and S. S. Schmidt, eds., The Measurement of Productive Efficiency: Techniques 
and Applications. New York: Oxford University Press. 
GRIGORIAN, D. A., AND V. MANOLE (2002): “Determinants of Commercial Bank Performance in 
Transition: An Analysis of Data Envelope Analysis”. IMF Working Papers, 2/146. 
GUARDA, P., AND A. ROUABAH (2005): “Measuring Banking Output and Productivity: A User 
Cost Approach to Luxembourg Data.” Banque Centrale du Luxemburg, Memo. 
HANOUSEK, J., AND G. ROLAND (2001): “Banking Passivity and Regulatory Failure in Emerging 
Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic.” CERGE–EI Working Paper 192. 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2005): Internal Documents for the Article IV Mission in the 
Czech Republic. 
KAMBEROGLOU,  N.  C.,  E.  LIAPIS,  G.  T.  SIMIGIANNIS, AND P.  TZAMOURANI (2004): “Cost 
Efficiency in Greek Banking.” Bank of Greece WP. 
KASMAN, A. (2002): “Cost Efficiency, Scale Economies, and Technological Progress in Turkish 
Banking.” Central Bank Review, 1, 1–20. 
KUMBHAKAR,  S., AND C.  A.  KNOX  LOVELL (2000): Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Cambridge 
University Press. 
MESTER,  L. (1992): “Efficiency in the Savings and Loan Industry.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 17, 267–286. 
LANE,  W.  R.,  S.  W.  LOONEY, AND J.  W.  WANSLEY (1986): “An Application of the Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model to Bank Failure.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 10, 511–
531. 24   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
LOONEY, S. W., J. W. WANSLEY, AND W. R. LANE (1989): “An Examination of Misclassifications 
with Bank Failure Prediction Models.” Journal of Economics and Business, 41, 327–336. 
MESTER, L. (1996): “A Study of Bank Efficiency Taking Into Account Risk Preferences.” Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 20, 1025–1045. 
SAHAJWALA,  R., AND P. VAN DEN BERGH, (2000): “Supervisory Risk Assessment and Early 
Warning Systems.” BIS Working Papers 4, Bank for International Settlements. 
SEBALLOS, L. D., AND J. B. THOMSON (1990): “Underlying Causes of Commercial Bank Failures 
in the 1980s.” Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  
SHAFFER, S. (2004): “External Versus Internal Economies in Banking.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, forthcoming. 
STAVÁREK, D. (2003): “Banking Efficiency in Visehrad Countries Before Joining the European 
Union.”  Paper prepared for the Workshop on Efficiency of Financial Institutions and 
European Integration, October 2003, Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal. 
SHUMWAY,  T. (2001): “Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.” 
Journal of Business, 74(1), 101–124. 
WEILL,  L. (2003a): “Banking Efficiency in Transition Economies: The Role of Foreign 
Ownership.” The Economics of Transition, 11(3), 569–592. 
WEILL, L. (2003b): “Is There a Lasting Gap in Bank Efficiency Between Eastern and Western 
European Countries?” mimeo. 
WEILL, L. (2004): “Measuring Cost Efficiency on European Banking: A Comparison of Frontier 
Techniques.” Journal of Productivity Analysis, 21(2), 133–152. 
WHALEN, G. (1991): “A Proportional Hazards Model of Bank Failure: An Examination of its 
Usefulness as an Early Warning Tool.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic 
Review, First Quarter, 21–31. 
WHEELOCK, D., AND P. WILSON (1995a): “Evaluating the Efficiency of Commercial Banks: Does 
Our View of What Banks Do Matter?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 
July/August 1995. 
WHEELOCK,  D., AND P.  WILSON (1995b): “Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, 
Regulation and Efficiency.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, 689–700. 
WILLIAMS, J., AND E. P. M. GARDENER (2003): “The Efficiency of European Regional Banking.” 
Regional Studies, 37(4), 321–330. 
  Deteriorating Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banks Signals an Increasing Risk of Failure    25 
 
 Appendix  
 
Table A-1  1994  2002 
   Assets      Assets     
Bank (order of CNB's register)  (CZK mln)  Ownership   (CZK mln)  Ownership / Status  
Komerční Banka, a.s.   316 815  Czech   473 703 Foreign  
Československá Obchodní Banka, a.s.  145 534  Czech   540 077  Foreign  
Živnostenská Banka, a.s.    25 627  Czech   51 801 Foreign  
Agrobanka, a.s.  61 399  Czech  Failure (1997) 
GE Capital Bank, a.s.   -    -         53 084 Foreign (entry 1998) 
Česká Spořitelna, a.s.    344 837  Czech   467 299 Foreign  
Banka Bohemia, a.s.    13 408  Czech   Failure (1994) 
Banka Baska, a.s.    5 442  Czech   Failure (1997) 
Pragobanka, a.s.    14 545  Czech   Failure (1998) 
Kreditní a průmyslová banka, a.s.    2 436  Czech   Failure (1995) 
Ekoagrobanka, a.s.    15 482  Czech   Failure (1997) 
SOCIETE GENERALE   7 393  Foreign   Merger (2002) 
Kreditní Banka Plzeň, a.s.  14 654  Czech   Failure (1996) 
Českomoravská hypoteční banka, a.s.    5 153  Czech   16 861 Czech  
Banka Haná, a.s.    13 312  Czech   Failure (2000) 
AB BANKA, a.s.    13 903  Czech   Failure (1995) 
eBanka, a.s.    5 558  Czech   14 793 Foreign  
Interbanka, a.s.    2 708  Foreign   9 598 Foreign  
Citibank, a.s.    12 444  Foreign   76 771 Foreign  
Creditanstalt, a.s.    8 921  Foreign   Merger (1998) 
Bank Austria, a.s.    4 477  Foreign   Merger (1998) 
Evrobanka, a.s.    6 115  Czech   Failure (1997) 
HVB Bank Czech Republic, a.s.    -   -  124 806 Foreign (merger 2001) 
UNION Banka, a.s.    5 735  Czech   24 449 Czech (failure in 2003)  
ING Bank N.V.   6 507  Foreign bank 
branch  
44 614 Foreign bank branch  
Realitbanka, a.s.    1 140  Czech   Failure (1997) 
COOP Banka, a.s.    5 830  Czech   Failure (1998) 
Vereinsbank CZ, a.s.    9 298  Foreign   Merger (1998) 
HYPO-BANK CZ, a.s.    3 617  Foreign   Merger (1998) 
Dresdner Bank CZ, a.s.    5 716  Foreign   18 812 Foreign  
Česká Banka Praha, a.s.    8 413  Czech   Failure (1995) 
Českomoravská záruční  
a rozvojová banka, a.s. 
5 562  Czech   70 645 Czech  
Erste Bank Sparkassen (ČR), a.s.    4 367  Foreign   Merger (2000) 
Moravia Banka, a.s.    8 126  Czech   Failure (1999) 
Plzeňská Banka, a.s.    1 007  Czech   1 263 Czech (failure in 2003) 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Praha, a.s.    7 127  Foreign   15 884 Foreign  
IP Banka, a.s.    147 940  Czech   Failure (2000) 
První Slezská Banka, a.s.    1 135  Czech   Failure (1996) 
ABN AMRO Bank N.V   1 427  Foreign bank 
branch  
37 840 Foreign bank branch  
Raiffeisenbank, a.s.    2 720  Foreign   53 960 Foreign  
Velkomoravská Banka, a.s.    3 002  Czech   Failure (1998) 
J & T Banka, a.s.     2 735  Foreign   4 537 Foreign  
První Městská Banka, a.s.    719  Czech   7 972 Czech 
IC banka, a.s.    545  Foreign   1 282 Foreign  
Commerzbank AG, a.s.    12 742  Foreign bank 
branch  
85 326 Foreign bank branch  
Universal Banka, a.s.    2 780  Czech   Failure (1999) 
Všeobecná Úvěrová Banka, a.s.    1 324  Foreign bank 
branch  
2 428 Foreign bank branch  
Volksbank, a.s.    492  Foreign   14 462 Foreign  26   Anca Podpiera, Jiří Podpiera  
 
Table A-1 (cont.)      
Deutsche Bank A.G.    2 622  Foreign bank 
branch  
40 053 Foreign bank branch  
Foresbank, a.s.    1 043  Czech   Failure (1999) 
Waldviertler Sparkasse von 1842   -   -  4 121 Foreign bank branch  
(entry in 1996) 
 
Raiffeisenbank im Stiftland, Cheb  
-   - 
1 246
Foreign bank branch  
(entry in 1995) 
 
Sparkasse Muehlviertel-West  
-   - 
4 356
Foreign bank branch  
(entry in 1996) 
 
Česká exportní banka, a.s.   
-   - 
24 597
Czech 
(entry in 1996) 
 
HSBC Bank plc - Pobočka Praha  
-   - 
22 392
Foreign bank branch  
(entry in 1998) 
Note: GE Capital bank entered the market by purchasing a part of Agrobanka in 1998.  
Bank Austria merged with Creditanstalt and formed Bank Austria Creditanstalt in 1998. 
Vereinsbank merged with HYPO-Bank and formed Hypovereinsbank in 1998. 
Česká Spořitelna merged with Erste Bank Sparkassen in 2000 and continued as Česká Spořitelna. 
Hypovereinsbank merged with Bank Austria Creditanstalt and formed HVB Bank in 2001. 
Komerční banka merged with the foreign bank branch of Société Générale in 2002 and continued 































 Table A-2   Country  Year  Banks (number of institutions) Definition  mean/min    max/min   coef of var 
Price of Labor                 
Podpiera and Podpiera (2005)  Czech Republic   2000 all   employee expenses / number of employees   2.96 7.69 0.64 
Mester (1992)   USA   1991 Mutual S&Ls (807 institutions)   labor expenses/number of full-time equiv. emplo.   2.05  4.6  - 
      Stock S&Ls (208 institutions)   labor expenses/number of full-time equiv. emplo.   2.2  6.06  - 
Kamberoglou et al. (2004)   Greece  1999 all   employee expenses / number of employees   1.59  1.93  - 
Shaffer (2004)   USA   2000 U.S. overall (deposit rate)   employee expenses / number of employees   -  -  0.46 
      Texas (deposit rate)   employee expenses / number of employees   -  -  0.24 
Williams and Gardener (2000)   Western Europe  1998 Western European countries   employee expenses / number of employees   4.44  9.96  0.36 
Bauer et al. (1998)   USA   1997-88 U.S.   employee expenses / number of employees   2.84  14.37  0.22 
Price of Borrowed Funds                   
Podpiera and Podpiera (2005)  Czech Republic   2000 all   interest expenses / (accepted deposits, issued sec.)  3.67  7.67  0.36 
Mester (1992)   USA   1991 Mutual S&Ls (807 institutions)   interest expenses borrowed money / its stock    2  2 - 
      Stock S&Ls (208 institutions)   interest expenses borrowed money / its stock    2  2  - 
Weill (2003)   Poland, Czech Rep.  1997 domestically owned (selected banks)   interest paid / all funding   - -  0.73 
      foreign owned (selected banks)   interest paid / all funding   -  -  0.26 
Kasman (2002)   Turkey  1998 all   expenses on borrowed funds / funds   5.85  15.15  1.04 
Kamberoglou et al. (2004)   Greece  1999 all   total interest paid / (deposits and repos)   1.77  2.46  - 
Shaffer (2004)   USA   2000 U.S. overall (deposit rate)   interest on deposits / total deposits   - -  0.29 
      Texas (deposit rate)   interest on deposits / total deposits   -  -  0.22 
Williams and Gardener (2000)   Western Europe   1998 Western European countries   interest rate on deposits   2.01  3.78  0.23 
Bauer et al. (1998)   USA  1977–1988 U.S.   interest costs / total deposits   80  1730  0.5 
Casu and Girardone (2004)   Selected Europe   1994–2000 France   interest expenses / total customer deposits   3.53  20.12  0.62 
        Germany   interest expenses / total customer deposits   1.91  4.39  0.25 
        Italy   interest expenses / total customer deposits   5.08  16  0.44 
        Spain   interest expenses / total customer deposits   0.67  21.06  0.27 
         UK (50 banks)   interest expenses / total customer deposits   2  3.43  0.16 
Price of Physical Capital                   
Podpiera and Podpiera (2005)  Czech Republic   2000 all   expenses on premises and equipment/total fixed assets   7.5  19  0.6 
Weill (2003)   Poland, Czech Rep.  1997 domestically owned (selected banks)   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   - -  0.67 
      foreign owned (selected banks)   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   -  -  0.91 
Kasman (2002)   Turkey  1998 all   expenses on premises and equipment/total fixed assets   56.57  235.71  0.95 
Williams and Gardener (2000)   Western Europe   1998 Western European countries   expenses on physical capital / fixed assets   4.35  9.24  0.38 
Bauer et al. (1998)   USA  1977–1988 U.S.   expenses on premises and equipment/total fixed assets   1.77  2.81  0.13 
Casu and Girardone (2004)   Selected Europe   1994–2000 France   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   8.44  34.67  0.74 
        Germany   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   5.69  116.33  1.71 
        Italy   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   5.8  62.46  0.71 
        Spain   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   4.22  28.86  0.72 
         UK (50 banks)   non-interest expenses / total fixed assets   4.12  15.04  0.47 CNB WORKING PAPER SERIES 
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